SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE SUPREME COURT:
SHADOWS ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENTt
WO RECENT United States Supreme Court decisions have greatly extended the scope of the federal law of search and seizure. Yet a decade
has passed since the Court has reworked fourth amendment theory.
In pitching a tent, it is hazardous to lengthen one's ropes without strengthening one's stakes.
At the end of the 1959 Term, the Court, in Elkins v. United States,held that
"evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted by
federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible
... in a federal criminal trial."' The familiar "silver platter doctrine"2 was
thus discarded. But, by implication, Elkins introduced an even more important principle. The decision was clearly founded on the notion that state
searches which, if conducted by federal officers would violate the fourth
amendment, were searches in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth. 3 No longer was merely "the core of the Fourth Amendment" enforceable against the states.4 Fourth and fourteenth amendment standards
of reasonable search and seizure were assumed to be identical.
In Mapp v. Ohio,5 decided last Term, the Court made effective the substantive expansion of federal search and seizure law wrought in Elkins. "We
hold," said Mr. Justice Clark, "that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." 6 The federal exclusionary rule was thus grounded
in the Constitution and made binding on the states through the due process
t The Review will from time to time publish in this space longer and more extensive
work of general interest contributed by members of its Editorial Board.
1 364 U.S. 209, 223 (1960).
2 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28, 33 (1927); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State
and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083 (1959).
3 "As the Court's rule only purports to exclude evidence seized by state officers in violation of the Constitution, it is plain that the Court assumes for the purposes of these cases
that, as a consequence of Wolf, precisely the same rules are applicable in determining
whether the conduct of state officials violates the Constitution as are applicable in determining whether the conduct of federal officials does so ..
" Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 209, 237 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
5 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

6 Id. at 655.
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clause. At the same time, the Elkins extension of substantive fourth amendment standards to the states was acknowledged: "Federal-state cooperation

in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if
only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same
7
fundamental criteria in their approaches."
As a result of Elkins and Mapp twenty-four states which, in the absence of
any exclusionary rule, have had little occasion to consider the law of search
and seizure, must now conform to federal standards in securing evidence to be
used in criminal trials.8 Even the remaining states which already employ
some form of exclusionary rule must adjust their substantive law to conform
to fourth amendment requirements.
It is appropriate, at the threshold of an era in which Supreme Court interpretations of the fourth amendment will affect the daily operations of police
and courts throughout the land, to reexamine the theory revealed in those

interpretations.
In the past two decades, Supreme Court search and seizure cases have
been characterized by conflict, confusion, and even bitterness. 9 The struggles
have centered on a variety of issues: the relation between search warrants and
the requirement of reasonableness;10 the evidence necessary to constitute
probable cause sufficient to justify either arrest or the issuance of a warrant;"
the scope of lawful search incident to a valid arrest;' 2 and, of course, the substance and enforceability of constitutional restrictions on searches by state
7 Id. at 658.
8 For a list of those states which had not, by 1960, adopted any form of exclusionary
rule, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 209, 224-25 (1960) (Appendix to Opinion of the
Court, Table I).
9 Members of the Court have often referred to the conflicting pattern of decisions. See,
e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 716 (1948) ("At best, the operation of the rule
which the Court today enunciates for the first time may be expected to confound confusion
in a field already replete with complexities.") (Vinson, C. J., dissenting); United States v.
Rabinowitz 339 U.S. 56, 67 (1950) ("In no other field has the law's uncertainty been more
clearly manifested.") (Black, J., dissenting); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618
(1961) ("The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has
not-to put it mildly-run smooth. The Court's opinion in this case is hardly calculated, I
regret to say, to contribute to clarification.") (Frankfurter, J., concurring); ("For some years
now the field has been muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire.") (Clark, J.,
dissenting). Id. at 622.
10 See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950); Reynard, Freedom from UnreasonableSearch and Seizure-A Second
Class ConstitutionalRight? 25 IND. L.J. 259 (1950).
11See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Barrett, PersonalRights,
Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Stp. CT. REv. 46.
12
See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Way,
Increasing Scope of Search Incident to Arrest, 1959 WAsH. U.L.Q. 261.
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officers.' 3 Only the last of these issues appears clearly to be resolved at the
present time.14 Typically, since the Second World War, important decisions
have commanded only slender majorities.IS Moreover, substantial changes in
Court personnel have not seen positions first announced by such majorities
become firmly entrenched. Rather, the gradual change in personnel has led to
radical shifts in position, and to bitter complaints produced by "unexpected
changes in the Court's composition and the contingencies in the choice of
successors."

16

In his article, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the
Civil Liberties,17 Allen has suggested that this instability is to be explained
in part by the difficulty of choosing between two competing values, each of the
highest and most obvious importance: the right of privacy and the need for
effective law enforcement. "So long," he says, "as the Court feels itself compelled to resolve these issues by choosing one set of social values to the exclusion of the other, any decision must inevitably leave the law in a state of unstable equilibrium."' 8 But competing values are not unique to search and
seizure law. The possibility of conflict appears whenever constitutional limitations are imposed on law enforcement. Still, one is hard-pressed to call to
mind areas of equally deep dispute and irresolution.
It is suggested in this article that the conflicts and confusions in search and
seizure law have a dual source: first, the difficulty which the Court has experienced in interpreting an ambiguous amendment largely barren of historical gloss; second, and perhaps more important, the failure of the courts to
develop a definition of the liberty to be protected which is capable of guiding
amendment interpretations by clear social policies. The results, during the
first half of this century, were several. (a) The liberty preserved by the amendment came to be called "the right of privacy"-a notion drawn largely from
property law. That right, scarcely capable of explaining the full restrictions
imposed on law enforcement efforts, nevertheless diverted the Court from an
analysis of the broad range of values which often affected its decisions. At the
same time, the right of privacy imported into search and seizure anomalous
13
See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952); Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45
fLL. L. REv. 1 (1950). It is noteworthy that Allen, in his suggestion that the federal exclusionary rule be extended to the states, anticipated virtually every argument for that position
advanced by the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1
4Even the suggestion that fourth and fourteenth amendment requirements are now
identical may be open to doubt, inasmuch as it rests upon obiter dicta and implication from
the Elkins decision.
15Out of approximately 30 search and seizure cases decided by the Court during the
period, nearly two-thirds were determined by 6-3 or 5-4 votes.
1
6United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting).
17 Supra note 13, at 3.
18Id.at4.
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rigidities derived from private property law. (b) Pressing law enforcement
needs were accomodated by an ad hoc expansion of the right of search incident to arrest. But, for all its importance to actual police practice, the doctrine was related to neither the language nor the policies of the amendment
until 1950. (c) United States v. Rabinowitz,' 9 by enthroning the rule of reasonableness, made search incident to arrest constitutionally respectable. At the
same time, however, the rule cast into bold relief the bankruptcy of clear
objectives which has characterized search and seizure decisions.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said:
The divisions in this Court over the years regarding what is and what is not to be
deemed an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and
the shifting views of members of the Court in this regard, prove that in evolving
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment the decisions of this Court have frequently
turned on dialectical niceties and have not reflected those fundamental considera20
tions of civilized conduct on which applications of the Due Process Clause turn.
It is here suggested that fundamental considerations of civilized conduct have
been present in the cases, if not as clearly-defined objectives then as shadows
on the fourth amendment. It may be that the understanding of these shadowy
determinants at work in search and seizure law is essential to the restoration
of communication between the Court and the people whose sensibilities the
Constitution must ultimately reflect.
I. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Three recent decisions of the Court2I have been significant in "factoring
out" one of the major interests at work in search and seizure law. When the
fourth amendment is said to protect "the right of privacy," what is meant,
in part, is the right of undisturbed enjoyment of one's property, the right
to shut the door to officers of the state. 22 This concept, with roots deep in
the private law of property, has had a central influence upon search and
seizure law. Pitt appealed to it in his eloquent arguments against the general
warrant: "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces
of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through
it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not
enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." 23
Lord Camden, in Entick v. Carrington, based his classic ruling against the
validity of general warrants on the same ground: "The great end, for which
19 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
20 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 209, 238-39 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
21 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960);

Ohio ex rel.Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
22
See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1949); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14, 17 (1948).
23 Quoted inCOOLEY, CONSTrrtlONAL LIMITATIONS 299 n.3 (1868).
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men entered into society, was to secure their property.... By the laws of
England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.
No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable
to an action, even though the damage be nothing." 24 This property-based
right of privacy, in addition to lending its name to the whole of the liberty
which the fourth amendment is said to safeguard, may be the only civil
liberty operating on the amendment which has been clearly articulated by the
courts.
Search and seizure cases typically involve searches for evidence of crime.
The significance of the recent cases is that the searches there considered were
initiated with a view to civil, rather than criminal, proceedings. The interest
at stake was, in the eyes of the majority, what might be called the "pure"
right of privacy, i.e., the interest violated by the entry and search itself, apart
from any consequences which might incidentally result. The difference between the restrictions imposed on these administrative searches, and the restrictions normally imposed on searches for evidence of crime, provides, it is
suggested, the measure of the influence which hidden objectives have had on
search and seizure law.
In Frank v. Maryland,25 a city health officer, in response to a complaint
regarding the presence of rats in the neighborhood, knocked on the door
of appellant's house. Receiving no answer, the officer inspected the area
outside the house and found evidence of rodent-infestation. During the
course of this inspection the officer was accosted by appellant who asked
for an explanation for the officer's presence. The officer responded that he
had evidence of unhealthful conditions and requested permission to inspect
the basement area. Appellant refused. Later the officer returned, and receiving
no response to his knock, swore out a warrant for appellant's arrest, alleging
a violation of Section 120 of the Baltimore City Code, which requires that
property owners admit health officers for purposes of determining whether
suspected nuisances exist. 26 On appeal from a subsequent conviction and
fine, appellant challenged the validity of section 120 under the fourteenth
amendment.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a five-man majority, had little
difficulty in finding the provisions of section 120 consistent with due process
of law. The right to demand entry,27 granted to city health officers under the
24 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765).
25 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 265 (1959);
Comment, 44 MINN. L. Rav. 513 (1960).
26 Art. 12, § 120 of the Code provides:

"Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance
exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day time, and
if the owner or occupier shall refuse to delay to open the same and admit a free examination,
he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars." 359 U.S. at 361.
27 The majority interpreted the statute as giving no right of forceful entry. 359 U.S.
at 366-67. For criticism of this construction, see Waters, Rights of Entry of Administrative
Officers, 27 U. Ca. L. Rxv. 79 (1959).
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ordinance, was to be "assessed in the light of the needs which... produced
it."28 The "slight" invasions of privacy permitted were to be weighed against
the substantial interests of the community in seeing that hazards to public
health were eliminated. Appellant's resistance was characterized as being
based "on a rarely-voiced denial of any official justification for seeking to
enter his home. The constitutional 'liberty' that is asserted is the absolute
right to refuse consent for an inspection designed and pursued solely for
the protection of the community's health, even when the inspection is con29
ducted with due regard for every convenience of time and place."
The majority opinion would have been less striking had it merely defined
fourteenth amendment protections against state intrusions upon privacy.30
But the majority was prepared to make an afortioriargument for the constitu31
tionality of section 120 based on standards of the fourth amendment.
A vigorous dissent was filed by Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by the Chief
Justice, and Justices Black and Brennan. 32 The broad rights granted under
the Baltimore ordinance conformed to none of the standards formerly
applied to searches and seizures. No warrant was required, nor were searches
to be made incident to criminal arrest. The demand for entry was justified
by mere suspicion rather than probable cause. "The decision today," said
Mr. Justice Douglas, "greatly dilutes the right of privacy.... We witness
33
today an inquest over a substantial part of the Fourth Amendment."
The belief that the Frank opinion could not be dismissed as interpretative
34
of only the fourteenth amendment gained support in Abel v. United States,
decided by the Court in 1960. There, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation suspected appellant of being an espionage agent of the Soviet Union.
Despite intensive investigation and surveillance of the suspect, the Justice
Department determined that its evidence was insufficient to arrest and convict
28 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
291d. at 366.

30 The significance for Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the fact that a search and seizure
case arises under the fourteenth, rather than the fourth amendment, must not be underestimated. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
233 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
31 In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking
for the Court, said that "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is
therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause." It would appear to be the case that a search violative of ordered liberty would, if conducted by federal officers, violate the fourth amendment
requirement of reasonableness. Therefore, searches not violative of fourth amendment
protections will a fortiori not violate the fourteenth amendment's protections of the right
of privacy.
32 359 U.S. at 374.
33 Id. at 374.

34 362 U.S. 217 (1960). See Note, 107 U. PA. L. R-v. 1192 (1959); Comment, 34 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 159 (1959); Note, 74 HI-ARv. L. REv. 81, 154 (1960).
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Abel on charges of espionage. Thereupon, the evidence, which indicated
that petitioner was an alien residing illegally in this country, was turned over
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, for possible use in deportation
proceedings. The INS agents, having secured an "administrative arrest warrant" from the Acting District Director of INS, went, together with FBI
agents, to Abel's hotel room. There, the INS officers placed petitioner under
formal arrest, and conducted an intensive search of the room and of petitioner's belongings. A further search of the hotel room was made by FBI agents
after Abel had been removed. Evidence from these searches formed the basis
for a criminal indictment and conviction on the charge of espionage.
On appeal, the administrative arrest was not subject to direct attack;
its validity had been conceded by petitioner below. Before the Court, however,
was the question of whether such an arrest gave rise to an incidental right of
search and seizure. The administrative warrant employed had been issued
by an officer of the arresting agency, rather than by an independent magistrate. The statute authorizing the arrest did not require a showing of probable
cause,35 nor did the Court inquire whether probable cause had been, or
36
could have been demonstrated.
The minority argued, under these circumstances, that no analogy could
be drawn to the right of search incident to criminal arrest, whether with or
without a warrant. The over-all protections given to the individual were
not equivalent in the two procedures. In the case of criminal arrest and
incidental search, it was claimed, the existence of probable cause would be
determined by a judicial officer either prior to the arrest, if a warrant were
employed, or following the search when the arrestee was brought, as required
by law, before a magistrate.37 In the case of the administrative arrest, on the
other hand, probable cause, if present at all, was determined by an officer
of the arresting agency; and the agency was under no obligation to bring
the arrestee before the courts for a review of that determination.3 8
35

Section 242 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provides that "Pending
a determination of deportability in the case of any alien ... such alien may, upon warrant
of the Attorney General, be arrested and taken into custody." 66 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1252
(a) (1958). The regulations under the act delegate the authority to issue these administrative
warrants to the District Directors of the INS "[a]t the commencement of any proceeding
[to deport] ... or at any time thereafter.., whenever, in [their]... discretion, it appears
that the arrest of the respondent is necessary or desirable." 8 CFR § 242.2 (a) (1958).
The "Operating Instructions" of the INS direct that "an applicationto commence proceedings to deport should be based upon a showing of a prima facia case of deportability." 362
U.S. at 232 (emphasis added).
3
6 Although the validity of the administrative arrest did not depend upon a showing
of probable cause, the minority argued that the attachment of a right of incidental search
should depend upon such a showing. 362 U.S. at 252-53.
37 See FFD. R. CRam. P. 4,5, 41. But see Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
38
Neither § 242 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, nor the regulations
thereunder, impose any limitation on the authority of INS officers to issue arrest warrants
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, questioned the alleged
disparity of protections, but argued, as in Frank, that the fourth amendment
does not impose the same standards upon administrative searches as upon
searches for evidence of crime. 39 Assuming good faith on the part of the
arresting officers, only the fourth amendment's protection of the right of
privacy was involved; that interest was clearly outweighed by the interests
of society in the deportation of a suspected alien. Abel may be said to have
further narrowed the protections which the Frankcase had accorded the right
of privacy. In Abel the Court could no longer say that the search in question
was "designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant, and to cause only the slightest restriction on his claims of privacy." 40
Indeed the invasions were perhaps as great as the Court had ever before
4
considered in a fourth amendment case. 1
The view of the majority toward probable cause to justify an administrative
search may be seen in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price42 decided the same Term.
The facts were similar to those in Frank v. Maryland. In Price, however,
city inspectors demanded entry to petitioner's home without any grounds
to believe, so far as the record reveals, that proscribed conditions existed
within. Furthermore, the record does not indicate that the demanded inspection was made in pursuance of a routine spot check of individual homes. Four
members of the Frank and Abel majorities43 voted against noting probable
after the commencement of deportation proceedings; the "Operating Instructions" of
the INS merely state that in commencing such proceedings-which are wholly administrative rather than judicial in nature-there "should" be a showing of a "prima facia case"
of deportability. See note 35 supra.
Under the act all determinations of the Attorney General-whether concerning detention, release on bond, parole, or deportation-are final and conclusive, with one exception.
§ 1252 (a) provides: "Any court of competent jurisdiction shall have authority to review
or revise any determination.., concerning detention, release on bond, or parole pending
final decision of deportability upon a conclusive showing in habeas corpus proceedings
that the Attorney Generalis not proceedingwith such reasonabledispatchas may be warranted.
." 66 Stat. 208, U.S.C. § 1252 (a) (1958) (emphasis added).
39
"The differences between the procedural protections governing criminal and deportation arrests are not of a quality or magnitude to warrant the deduction of a constitutional
difference regarding the right of incidental search. If anything, we ought to be more vigilant,
not less, to protect individuals and their property from warrantless searches made for the
purpose of turning up proof to convict than we are to protect them from searches for matter
bearing on deportability. According to the uniform decisions of this Court, deportation
proceedings are not subject to the constitutional safeguards for criminal prosecutions.
Searches for evidence of crime present situations demanding the greatest, not the least,
restraint upon the government's intrusion into privacy; although its protection is not limited
to them, it was at these searches which the Fourth Amendment was primarily directed."
362 U.S. at 237.
40 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
41 See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,223-25,251 (1960); Record, pp. 22-32, 58-62.
42 364 U.S. 263 (1960). See Note, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 447 (1961).
43 Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker. Mr. Justice Stewart, the fifth
member of the Frank and Abel majorities, took no part in the consideration of the case.
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jurisdiction, indicating in a special memorandum 44 that they considered
the Frank decision "completely controlling." The judgment upholding the
45
inspection ordinance was affirmed by an equally-divided Couirt.
The conclusion to be drawn from these recent cases is that when a search
is not made for evidence of crime, or does not otherwise threathen "further
deprivations of life, liberty, or property," only the right of privacy is said to
be at stake. This interest does not require and could not justify, in the eyes
of the Court, the full protection which customary restrictions on search and
seizure provide. Customary restrictions on searches for evidence of crime
must find their justification in additional civil liberties capable of balancing
the necessities of law enforcement. 46 The administrative search cases demonstrate a failure of the Court to identify these additional interests.
The distinction which the Court sought was not, of course, self-evident.
In a case similar to Frank, Judge Prettyman had concluded that "to say that
a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search of his home
without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity." 47 The rebuttal upon which the Supreme
Court was to rest was found in a peculiarly' opaque passage from Frank:
[Tiwo protections emerge from the broad constitutional proscription of official
invasion. The first of these is the right to be secure from intrusion into personal
privacy, the right to shut the door on officials of the state unless their entry is under
proper authority of law. The second, and intimately related protection, is selfprotection: the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its design the securing
of information to fortify the coercive power of the state against the individual,
information which may be used to effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or
property. Thus, evidence of criminal action may not, save in very limited and closely
confined situations, be seized without a judicial warrant.... [HRistory makes plain
44 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Both the special memorandum and the dissenting opinion
following affirmance by an equally-divided Court are unusual. Ordinarily, the judgment
of any four justices on the question of noting probable jurisdiction is accepted without
indication of dissent. Application for review of Price, however, came before the Court
within two weeks of the Frank opinion. In the view of the Justices opposed to noting probable jurisdiction, the cases involved exactly the same constitutional questions. "The result,
for all practical purposes," said Mr. Justice Clark, "is a reconsideration of the constitutional
question decided in Frank by a full Court. This flies in.the face of the real purpose... of
our Rule 58 which permits rehearing only 'at the instance of a justice who concurred in
the judgment or decision ....... 360 U.S. at 249.
45 Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
46 Absent Abel, the problem might not have arisen. Administrative searches could have
been distinguished from criminal searches, and a difference in safeguards justified, in terms
of the degree of harm normally involved; the constitutional interests at stake might have
been the same. Abel showed, however, that administrative searches are not limited to basements and rubbish bins. Qualitative, not quantitative differences in harm were demanded
if the distinction was to survive.
4

7 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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that it was on the issue of the right to be secure from searches for evidence to be
used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental
liberty was fought.48
Only the first of these two rights was involved in administrative searches.
Both were threatened in searches for evidence of crime.
A distinction based on the subsequent harms which may result from a
search is a tempting one. The quoted passage may suggest that the more
serious the threat of injury which a search poses, the greater the justification
which should be demanded for the search. Thus, searches for evidence of
crime, posing the threat of subsequent conviction and criminal sanctions,
should be surrounded with greater safeguards than are administrative searches.
In this notion may lie an elementary but pervasive error in fourth amendment
theory. Searches for evidence of crime may be required to secure criminal
convictions; the justification for the search, however, cannot and need not
justify the resulting conviction. The conviction and its results are independently justified by the fact of the crime, evidence of which the search has un49
covered.
No conflict arises with an argument, properly employed in support of
the exclusionary rule, 50 that the state should not benefit from the illegal

behavior of its officers, that illegally secured evidence should not form the
basis for a criminal conviction. That argument, when applied to the present
issue, however, begs the very question to be answered: what standards shall
be imposed on searches and seizures?
Thus, whatever "history makes plain" 5 1 and whatever may be meant by
359 U.S. at 365.
49 A partial explanation for confusion on this point may lie in misunderstandings of
the exclusionary rule which renders inadmissable evidence secured through illegal or
"unjustified" search and seizure. It might be concluded that the rule assumes that such
convictions would themselves be unjustified. Such a position would properly be subject
to Wigmore's charge of "sentimentality" toward offenders, (8 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2184
(3d ed. 1940)) or to Cardozo's characterization: "The criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered." (People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).)
Arguably, neither the exclusionary rule nor the fourth amendment which it was designed
to enforce has as its purpose the protection of any but the innocent. So long as guilt
or innocence is undetermined, however, restrictions must be imposed on all searches and
seizures. To enforce those restrictions, the exclusionary rule merely deprives officers, who
have conducted unjustified, but successful, searches of the fruits of their unlawful behavior.
50 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 13, at 20.
51 In the passage quoted from Frank, Mr. Justice Frankfurter may virtually have conceded
that history lends only inconclusive support to the proposed distinction between restrictions
on criminal and administrative searches. One of the cases upon which he relied, Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), involved the compulsory production of documents
in a forfeiture proceeding. Criminal penalties were not at issue. Similarly, the colonial
writs of assistance, against which the fourth amendment was directed, were often employed
merely to find and seize smuggled goods subject to forfeiture. See generally LAssoN, HIsToRY
48

AND DEvELoPMENT OF THE FouRTH AMENIMENT TO TBE UNrfnu
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51-78 (1937). The purpose for seeking information in these circumstances was admittedly
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"the right of self-protection," introduced for the first time in Frank, this
much is clear. The subsequent disadvantages to the individual which may
result from a search for evidence of crime cannot support the distinction
in protections upon which the recent administrative cases rest. The distinction
must be justified, if at all, by the full range of interests which bear upon the
operation of the fourth amendment.

If. PRIVATE LAW AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Whatever may be said of the treatment which the proprietary interesl
at stake in the Frank case recieved at the hand of Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
it is clear that the common law of torts and property, in which such an interest
has its roots, has had a pervasive influence on the law of search and seizure.
Indeed, the conceptual framework within which the fourth amendment has
developed is a private law framework designed to secure undisturbed enjoyment of private property. 52 Only a few examples are necessary to recall the
almost total reliance of the fourth amendment's legal history on this conceptual scheme.
1. For a search to come within the contemplation of the amendment, it
must involve a physical trespass on a protected space. 5 3 The analogy is not
perfect, for the amendment does not prohibit searches in open fields even
if entry is trespassory. 54 This is only to say, however, that the spaces protected
by the amendment form a proper part of the more inclusive areas protected
by property law.
2. The remedy for unconstitutional search and seizure by federal officers
was, until 1914,55 the common law action in trespass. Until Mapp, this continued to be the basic remedy for violation of provisions against unreasonable
search and seizure in nearly half the states. 56 However unlawful the entry,
however thorough the search, or whatever the consequences in terms of embarrassment, notoriety or even criminal prosecution, the remedy was basically
the same as the property owner would have had against an intruding neigh57
bor.
"to fortify the coercive power of the state against the individual." But the recent cases
are not clearly distinguishable on these grounds. In Frank andPrice, the attempted searches,
if successful, were to result in the compulsory abatement of discovered nuisances. In Abel,
compulsory deportation was envisioned. In all three cases, some subsequent, if not immediate, limitations upon the rights of life, liberty or property were threatened.
52
See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 247, 261 (1960). Also see generally Barrett, supra note 11.
53 MAGUE, EviDENcE OF GUHLT 188 (1959). See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942). Compare Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
54 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
55 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
56 See Elkins v. United States 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960) (Appendix, Table 1).
57 Cf Note, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 68 (1925). But see 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1950).
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3. In the event of an unlawful seizure, the offended party is directed
to move in the courts for the return of his propertySS-an action not unlike
that of replevin.
4. Not everyone detrimentally affected by an unconstitutional search
and seizure has standing to secure a remedy, even where that remedy is
in the form of a suppression of evidence secured through illegal search.
Until the recent decision in Jones v. United States,5 9 courts of appeals had
generally required that the movant claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest
in the premises searched. The possessory interest was required to be greater
than that of an "invitee" or "guest." 60 The Court in Jones granted standing
to move for suppression of evidence'to "anyone legitimately on premises
61
where a search occurs."
5. The Court's difficulty in dealing with modern electronic methods of
eavesdropping, where no physical trespass on private property is involved,
reflects a conceptual framework drawn from the law of property. In Goldman
v. United States, 62 officers overheard defendant's conversations in an adjoining
office by means of a delicate microphone placed against a common wall.
The officer's testimony concerning the conversations was held by the Court
to be admissible into evidence on the ground that no physical trespass was
involved. In Silverman v. United States63 police officers accomplished the
same objective by driving a "spike microphone" several inches into a party
wall. The Court declined to overrule Goldman, yet refused to go beyond it
"by even a fraction of an inch." "Decision here does not turn upon the
technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local law," claimed
Mr. Justice Stewart for the unanimous Court. "It is based upon the reality
of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." 64 But the
fraction of an inch was decisive and the evidence secured by the spike microphone held inadmissable.
6. Restrictions on "seizables," even when found in the course of a lawful
search, bear the same marks. In Gouled v. United States, the Court stated
that even pursuant to a warrant, search and seizure "may be resorted to
only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the
interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be
58

See Segurolo v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927).
59 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
60 Id. at 265, 266. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
61 362 U.S. at 367.
62316 U.S. 129 (1942). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); On
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
63 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
64 Id. at 512.
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seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the
police power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful
and provides that it may be taken." 65 Thus, there emerged in the cases an
exclusive list of categories of property which might be the object of lawful
search and seizure. The categories include contraband 66 (the unauthorized
possession of which is illegal), stolen property67 (the rightful owner being
entitled to possession), excisable or dutiable articles 6 8 (the government having
a lien-type interest to insure payment of duties thereon), and instrumentalities
of crime 69 (the owner having abused state-granted property rights, thereby
subjecting the chattels to governmental seizure, the purpose of which is the
suppression of a nuisance). It may be that this property-based theory of
seizables best explains the long-standing rule of the Court forbidding the
seizure of "merely evidentiary articles." 70 To say that objects have merely
evidentiary importance may be to say that no defect in title or possessory
71
interest legitimizes their seizure from a rightful owner.
The pervasive influence of the conceptual framework of private property
law may explain the tendency of the courts to speak as if the right of privacy
were the only civil liberty protected by the fourth amendment. But it is
interesting to note that the law of property does not itself support the high
rigid standards which have traditionally been imposed on searches for evidence of crime. If the fourth amendment requires only that personal privacy
be balanced against the need of society for law enforcement, the substantive
standards of property law should be reflected in the constitutional standard of
reasonableness for search and seizure; the constitutional standard of reasonableness would never be more restrictive than is the law of property itself.
The right to freedom from trespassory incursions on private property was
never absolute at common law. Both entries upon land and interferences
72
with personal property were permitted when public necessity required.
Indeed, even private "necessity" justified invasions of property which would
otherwise be trespassory. 73 The degree of public or private need required,
65 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
66
See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1947).
67 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886).
68 Ibid.
69
See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
70 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 587 (1949); Comment, Limitationson Seizure of"Evidentiary" Objects, a Rule in Search
of a Reason, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 319 (1953).
71But see pp. 692-98 infra.
72
See PRossm, ToRTs 96 nn.71-76 (2d ed. 1955) and cases cited therein.
73 See Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 Atl. 188 (1908). Compare Vincent v. Lake Erie
Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). See generally PRossER, op. cit. supra
note 72, at 97-98 nn.77-83.
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however, has varied from period to period.74 In describing the Frankdecision
as "an inquest over a substantial part of the fourth amendment," the minority
may have reflected the view that the amendment had elevated eighteenth
century property rights to the level of a constitutional liberty.75 Well it may
be that the search for rats and rubbish was insufficient in the eighteenth
century to justify an entry of the King into the ruined tenement. Since the
enactment of the amendment, however, the law's reverence for private property has diminished substantially with the ever-increasing complexity of urban
society. It is not clear that the rights granted health officers in Baltimore
were substantially greater than those possessed by a private citizen acting
76
to abate a nuisance.
If the amendment did not ossify the substantive protections of property
during any given period, it may well be said to have extended against officers
of the state whatever restrictions would be imposed by an evolving law of
property. And if this notion were to be reflected in constitutional standards
of reasonable search and seizure, the result might well be a calculus, rather
than a body of rules defining reasonableness. The determinants of the calculus
would include those factors considered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Frank
'. Maryland: the seriousness of the invasion of privacy involved, the probability that the search would uncover the offending objects sought, and the
public need by which the invasion was sought to be justified.77 By operation
of such a calculus, the detection of minor crimes might legitimize only minor
invasions of privacy. Virtual certainty of success, by objective standards,
would justify greater invasions than could be countenanced on the basis of
less adequate information. The necessity of resolving or preventing a particularly heinous crime might justify minor invasions on the liberty of many
individuals, even where the probability of success in any given case was low.
Although such a calculus may comport with untutored views of reasonableness, no such approach emerged from the history of fourth amendment litigation in the Supreme Court until the recent cases of administrative search.
Before that time, only Mr. Justice Jackson had ever given any indication
that such a calculus might be appropriate to the analysis of search and
seizure problems generally. It was he who in a dissenting opinion in Brinegar
v. United States said:

But if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment for these
reasons, it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense.
74 See Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 Atl. 188 (1908) and cases cited therein.
75 For Mr. Justice Douglas, if not for those who joined him, it must be said that the fourth
amendment, if it encompasses these property notions, is not limited by them. See On
Lee v. United States, 364 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (concurring opinion).
76 See Jones v. Williams, 152 Eng. Rep. 764 (1843); Maryland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ruth,
106 Md. 644, 68 Atl. 358 (1907); Hubbard v. Preston, 90 Mich. 221, 51 N.W. 209 (1892);
see PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 72, at 419-21 and cases cited therein.
77 359 U.S. at 366. 371.
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If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnapped and the officers throw a road
block about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be a drastic
and indiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard
to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be
reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a
threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such
a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch
7
a bootlegger. 8
The beginning of wisdom in search and seizure law may lie in asking why
it is that the calculus recently applied in Frank has not emerged from the
much longer history of cases involving searches for evidence of crime.
Hm. INTERPRETATIONS OF

THE FouRTH AmNDMET: THE

SEARCH FOR THE MISSING CONNEC=
The inflexibilities in traditional standards of search and seizure may be
traced, in large measure, to the language of the fourth amendment itself:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." 79
Much of the conflict which centers around these words concerns the proper
relationship between the reasonableness and warrant clauses.8 0 In vacuo,
the language might be read as establishing a general requirement of reasonableness for all searches and seizures, while commanding that if a warrant
be the authority for a search, it comply with certain formal requirements.
History, however, lends little support to such a reading.
The practice which precipitated the amendment was the use of general
warrants and writs of assistance by His Majesty's officers to enforce unpopular
taxation schemes. 8' The concomitant period in England saw the same devices
fall into ill-repute when employed in the suppression of political dissent.
In 1763, the courts of England declared general warrants illegal.8 2
That the framers of the amendment had as their primary, if not sole,
purpose the prohibition of general warrants is strikingly demonstrated in the
records of the first Congress. On August 17, 1789, the House of Representa78 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949).
79 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
80 See generally LAssoN, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FouRTH AMENDMENT

To THE UNrrED STATES CONsTITUTION 13-105 (1937); Reynard, Freedomfrom Unreasonable
Search and Seizure-A Second Class ConstitutionalRight? 25 IND. L.J. 259, 262-77 (1950).
81 See LASSON, op. cit. supra note 80, at 51-78.

82 Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153
(1763). See also Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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tives, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, debated a proposed draft of the
amendment. The draft read: "The right of the people to be secured in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly
8
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 3
The full debate on the draft is reported in a few paragraphs of the Annals.
Two amendments to the clause were proposed: "Mr. Gerry said he presumed
there was a mistake in the wording of this clause; it ought to be 'the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable seizures and searches,' and therefore moved that amendment." 84 The motion passed. The more crucial amendment to the proposed
draft was made by Benson: "Mr. Benson objected to the words 'by warrants
issuing.' This declaratory provision was good as far as it went, but he thought
it was not sufficient; he therefore proposed to alter it so as to read 'and
no warrant shall issue."' The report continues: "The question was put on
8
this motion and lost by a considerable majority." 5
When the committee appointed to arrange the articles of amendment,
under the chairmanship of Mr. Benson, reported to the House on August 24,
however, the fourth was worded in its present form. The change apparently
went unnoticed and the amendments were approved as reported.8 6 Senate
debates on the amendments were held in secret session, and no unofficial
report of discussion on the fourth is available. 87 There was, thus, no indication
that anything more was intended by the fourth amendment than the establishment of a warrant vehicle for official searches. The reasonableness clause
was barren of historical content.
The subsequent history of fourth amendment cases may be described as
a struggle between two interpretations. Otherwise described, it was a search
for a connective which would make clear the logical relationship of the
amendment's two clauses. The first construction was not clearly articulated
by the Court until after the Second World War. Arguably, however, it was
the premise upon which all prior cases had rested.88 The principle was stated
by Mr. Justice Jackson in Johnson v. United States:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of usual inferences which
83 ANNALS OF CONG. 783 (1789).

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Id. at 808-09; House Journal,Aug. 24, 1789.
8
7 See LASSON, op. cit. supra note 80, at 102 n.86.
88
Early commentators read the amendment to require warrants for all searches, with
narrow exceptions, and, in addition, to demand that warranted searches be conducted
reasonably. See, e.g., COOLEY, CONSTrTTIONAL LnTATIONS 299-308 (1868); BLACK,

CoNsTrrTUTONAL LAw 435-42 (1895).

680

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[VoL 28:664

reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime....
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule,
to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent.89
The same term, Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court in Trupiano
v. United States, was even more specific in saying: "it is a cardinal rule that,
in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use
search warrants wherever reasonably practicable." 90 The rule was straightforward, the relationship between the clauses of the amendment clear: save
for narrow exceptions arising from emergency circumstances, a valid warrant
was "a sine qua non of the reasonableness of a search."91
The striking rigor of the Trupiano rule lies in the amendment's warrant
requirements themselves. Warrants were to issue only upon a showing of
probable cause. The rule was interpreted to require a uniform quantum of
pre-search information for every search and seizure.92 However great or
slight the invasion, or however pressing the community interest at stake, the
threshold level of information required was the same.9 3 Two further requirements on the issuance of search warrants are significant. The probable
cause which justifies a warrant was to be "supported by Oath or affirmation."
Until some years after Trupiano, this requirement was interpreted to demand
that affiants declare only first hand information. "Hearsay evidence" could
not constitute probable cause. 94 The amendment further required that the
persons or things to be seized be particularly described in the warrant. Consequently, officers could not seize evidence which unexpectedly came to their
attention during the course of a warranted search.95
89 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
90 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948).
91 Cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950).
92
See, e.g., Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925); Steele v. United States
[No. 1), 267 U.S. 498 (1925); United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960).
93 An alternative interpretation of the probable cause requirement may have been
left open to the Court by the wording of the amendment. "Probable cause" might be interpreted "probable cause to issue." Included in the notion would be all the considerations
relevant to the proper issuance of the writ. See text accompanying notes 213-16 infra.
Read in this manner, the provision would itself embody the general requirement of reasonableness or appropriateness. The construction chosen by the Court, on the other hand,
clearly reads "probable cause" to mean "probable cause to believe that seizable objects
will be found in the place to be searched." The latter test is, in form, a factual one, once
the required level of probability is set. The former test may require a complex of valuational
judgments in addition to determining whether sought objects will be found.
94 See Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923); Poldo v. United States.
55 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1932). For the present rule see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
95 See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). But see note 141 infra.
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The continual resistance of law enforcement agencies to these restrictions
was to be expected. The reason for the requirement of personal knowledge
of affiants was clear. Yet customary and perhaps essential techniques for
acquiring information of crime were thwarted. In many circumstances, the
police were dependent upon informers and under-cover agents. But informers
often refused to sign their names to public affidavits for fear of reprisals,
and under-cover agents hesitated to do the same for fear of losing their
future effectiveness. 96 The greatest resistance of police to restrictions on
search developed during the period of national prohibition. With the widespread growth of new "victimless crimes," law enforcement agents became
especially dependent upon search as an investigative technique. Without
a complaining witness, however, the police found it difficult to anticipate
and to establish with probable cause, what objects would be found employed
in a criminal enterprise. The problem often arose even when officers had reasonable grounds to believe that a given individual had committed an offense.97
The second basic interpretation of the amendment appeared only two
years after Trupiano.98 Mr. Justice Minton, speaking for a new majority in
United States v. .Rabinowitz stated:
A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever
practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of easy administration. But
we cannot agree that this requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non
of the reasonableness of a search. . . . The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable
to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.99
In a sharply worded dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter retorted:
There must be a warrant to permit search, barring only inherent limitations upon
that requirement when there is a good excuse for not getting a search warrant.... It
is not a rule of thumb. It is a rule of the Fourth Amendment and of the reasons for
its adoption. It is not a rule invented in Trupiano v. United States.... It is not
a rule of those who came on this Court in recent years .... 100
96 Mr. Virgil Peterson, Operating Director of the Chicago Crime Commission, and former
FBI agent, has argued this point in Law and Police Practice: Restrictions in the Law of
Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 46, 57 (1957).
9
7 For a reference to widespread police resistence, see NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT OF THE PRomBmoN LAvs OF THE UNITED
STATES 66 (1931); see generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCE-

MENT, REPORT ON LAwLEsSNEss IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931). A modem police assessment

of the difficulties in operating under search warrants may be found in Affidavit of William
H. Parker, Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles, Appendix "D" to petition to appear
as Amicus Curiae and the Brief in Support of Respondent's petitions for Rehearing in
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. App. 461, 232 P.2d 905 (1955).
98 The death of Justices Rutledge and Murphy, members of the Trupiano majority,
had brought Justices Clark and Minton to the Court.
99 239 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950). With Mr. Justice Minton in the majority were the Chief
Justice, Justices Clark, Burton, and Reed. Dissenting were Justices Black, Jackson, and
Frankfurter. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration of the case.
100 339 U.S. at 83-84.
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The "unexpected changes in the Court's composition," of which Mr.
Justice Frankfurter complained in his dissent,101 however, could not fully
explain the radical shift in theory. The overruling of Trupiano was not a
random or capricious act. If Trupiano was the clearest articulation of a rule
upon which prior cases had rested, it nonetheless stated a rule which already
had been undermined by exceptions.
The first of these exceptions to traditional warrant requirements was the
02
right to search moving vehicles, established in Carroll v. United States.
The second, and far more important, was the right of search incident to
arrest. 103 Either exception might have been justified by reference to the requirement of reasonableness. Moving vehicles could escape the jurisdiction before
officers had time to secure a warrant 04 and without the right to deprive
offenders of weapons and other means of escape, officers could not safely
make arrests. 105 But traditional constructions of the amendment, as summarized in the rule of Trupiano, had not left the meaning of the reasonableness
101Id. at 86.
10z 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The search was made under authority of § 26, Title II of the
National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919) which imposed on officers the duty of
seizing intoxicating liquor transported contrary to law. In arguing that Congress did not intend that a warrant was to be required under this section, the Court pointed to a supplemental act which made searches of private dwellings without a warrant a misdemeanor. 42 Stat.
222, 223 (1921). The Court observed that the Stanley Amendment to the latter act, which
would have made all warrantless searches for liquor illegal, was defeated by Congress. The
House Judiciary Committee had objected to the amendmentin part, because "it will make it
impossible to stop the fin running automobiles engaged in alike illegal traffic." 267 U.S.
at 143-47. The Court also supported its ruling by reference to an act of the first Congress
which authorized customs officers to search "any ship or vessel, in which they shall have
reason to suspect any goods... subject to duty shall be concealed." Id. at 150. The same
act provided that a search warrant should be secured to enter any house or other buiding
to look for dutiable goods. Act of July 31, 1789, Sec. 24, 1 Stat. 29.
103 See 1 BISHOP, CRmNAL
PROcEDu
116-18 (3d ed. 1880). "The right goes back beyond
doubt to the days of the hue and cry, when there was short shrift for the thief who was
caught 'with the mainour,' still 'in seisin of his crime'." People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y.
193, 196, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (1923) and cases cited therein. An offender, "overtaken by
hue and cry while he has still about him the signs of his crime, ... will be bound, and
if we suppose him a thief, the stolen goods will be bound on his back." POLLACK & MArrLAND, 2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 579 (2d ed. 1899). Concerning early recognition of the
right to search an arrestee for fruits and instrumentalities of crime see BISHOP, id. at 116-17;
56 CENT. L.J. 303 (1903); 1 WHARTON, CRMINAL PROCEDURE 136 (10th ed. 1913).
104 In Carroll,this argument was suggested, but neither relied upon nor clearly grounded
in the language of the amendment. 367 U.S. at 153. Accord, United States v. Di RE, 332
U.S. 581, 585 (1948).
105 This argument was made by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent to United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,72 (1950), but was not related to the rule of reasonableness.
In his dissent to Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 195 (1947), Mr. Justice Jackson
suggested a rationale for the right to seize evidence of crime in a search incident to arrest:
"Of course, a warrant to take a person into custody is authority for taking into custody
all that is found upon his person or in his hands." Id. at 196. The warrant is for the arrest
of a clothed person.
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clause at large.1 A valid warrant was a sine qua non of the reasonableness
of a search. Thus vehicle search and search incident to arrest were exceptions
not only to the warrant requirement. They were exceptions to the amendment
itself.J07 Until Rabinowitz, they were justified by reference to history alone.
The gradual expansion of the right of search incident to arrest during
the first half of this century is too well known to require extended treatment. 108
Four basic steps were involved: (1) In Weeks v. United States the Court
first acknowledged, by dictum, "the right... always recognized under English
and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested
to discover the fruits or evidences of crime."1 09 (2) In Carroll,nO again by
way of dictum, the right was said to extend beyond the person of the arrestee
to the area under his immediate control. (3) In Marron v. United States,"'
a broad extension occurred which arguably found no support in the underlying
rationale. There, officers as incident to the arrest of a speakeasy operator
during business hours searched the entire premises, seizing a ledger book
found in a closet and various bills found in the room. A unanimous court
stated that "the authority of officers to search and seize the things by which
the nuisance was being maintained, extended to all parts of the premises
used for the unlawful purpose."" 2 (4) In Harrisv. United States,113 the broad
right of search allowed in Marron was not limited to cases of arrest for
criminal activities in progress. Rather, the Court upheld the validity of a
painstaking search of arrestee's entire apartment which resulted in the seizure
of contraband items totally unrelated to the offense for which the arrest
4
had been made."
106 See Harris v. United States. 331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947) "'Unreasonable' is not to be
determined with reference to a particular search and seizure considered in isolation.
The 'reason' by which search and seizure is to be tested is the 'reason' that was written
out of historic experience into the Fourth Amendment" (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
107 See id. at 168. "The only exceptions to the safeguard of a warrant issued by a magistrate are those which the common law recognized as inherent limitations of the policy
which found expression in the Fourth Amendment.... ." (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
108 See, e.g., Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q.
261; Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the FederalLaw of Search and Seizure, 33 IowA
L. Ray. 472 (1948); Reynard, supra note 80, at 289-306. See United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
109 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
110 267 U.S. at 158.
112 Id. at 199.
111275 U.S. 192 (1927).
13 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
1
14 A fifth step in the expansion of search incident to arrest may have occurred in Abel,
which arguably established that the fruits and instrumentalities of any crime are subjected
to seizure if found in the course of a search, conducted in good faith, for objects related
to the purpose for which the arrest was made. "When an article subject to lawful seizure
properly comes into an officer's possession in the course of a lawful search it would be
entirely without reason to say that he must return it because it was not one of the things
it was his business to look for." 362 U.S. 217, 238 (1960). In citing this proposition to
Harris,the Abel Court ignored the emphasis in Harris on the fact that the items there
seized were contraband and property of the United States government. 331 U.S. at 154-55.
See also Note, 107 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1192 (1959).
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Doctrinal developments do not reveal the full impact, however, which
the growing right of search incident to arrest had on search and seizure law.
For reasons already discussed,"15 police resistance to full warrant requirements
was strong. During the period of national prohibition it became stronger.
Thus the full weight of law enforcement requirements came to bear upon
the exception, and the exception grew to accommodate those needs. The end
of Prohibition brought no substantial lessening of those needs, for federal
responsibility in the enforcement of criminal statutes was rapidly expanding."16
The exception-perhaps irrevocably-engulfed the rule, if patterns of police
action 117 and frequency of cases are a proper indication."l8 Yet by eschewing
a justification in the rule of reasonableness, the Court had forfeited the guidance which the amendment might supply.
Rabinowitz constituted a fundamental change in fourth amendment theory.
First, the reasonableness clause became the dominant requirement of the
amendment. For nearly a century, able commentators had understood warrants to be required for all searches, save for exceptions not grounded in
the language of the Constitution. In addition, they read the amendment to
require that warranted searches be conducted reasonably.11 9 After Rabinowitz,
the issuance of search warrants would continue to be governed by the second
clause, but it was the rule of reasonableness rather than a "rule of thumb"
which determined when a warrant would be required.
Second, search incident to arrest, from its position as an historical exception, was brought squarely under the reasonableness clause of the amendment. 120 No immediate change in widely accepted search rights was involved,
but the implications for fourth amendment theory were broad. If the rule of

I'5 See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
116 Cf. Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the FBI, 37 IOWA
L. REv. 175 (1952).
117 From a 1952 sample of 770 arrests made in Philadelphia, only 24, or 3%, were authorized by warrants. Although searches of some kind were involved in most of the cases,
"the use of search warrants in the cases examined was virtually non-existent." Note,
PhiladelphiaPolice Practiceand the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1952); In Los
Angeles County, only 17 search warrants were issued in 1954. See Barrett, Exclusion of
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People vs. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L.
REv. 565, 570 (1955) and authorities cited therein.
118 Out of approximately 30 search and seizure cases decided by the Supreme Court
since the end of the Second World War, in only three does it appear that officers were acting
even under color of the authority of a search warrant: Rea v. United States, 350 U.S.
214 (1956); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493 (1958).
119
See Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class
ConstitutionalRight ? 25 IND. L.J. 259, 276 (1950) and authorities cited therein.
120 On occasion, however, the Court continues to speak of search incident to arrest
as an exception to the basic search warrant requirement. See United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960). See text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
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reason could justify warrantless searches incident to arrest, other doctrines of
warrantless, but reasonable, search were possible. 121
Third, in making the reasonableness clause the dominant requirement of
the amendment, Rabinowitz thrust to the center of fourth amendment litigation a test which had remained unused for more than a century and a
half. The Court recognized that "What is a reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution does not define what
are 'unreasonable' searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no
ready litmus-paper test. The recurring questions of the reasonableness of
122
searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case."
It was yet to be seen, however, whether the reasonableness clause was
capable of sustaining a fundamental liberty. If there were no conclusive
litmus-paper tests, were there any tests at all? Stare decisis would provide

stability, but prior cases had been judged on different grounds.123 And what
121 One candidate for new treatment within this framework is the right to search moving
vehicles, approved in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The argument from
practical necessity there made, although not relied upon, foreshadowed a possible justification of the holding under the first clause of the amendment. Although Carroll was cited
with approval in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), since Rabinowitz no occasion has arisen for the Court to reconsider the issue.
Apart from administrative searches, however, the Court had hesitated to acknowledge
a doctrine of reasonable search not incident to arrest. In Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610 (1961), officers searched petitioner's unoccupied house at the request of the landlord, and found an illegal distillery. The landlord's suspicions had been raised by a strong
odor of whiskey mash coming from the house. Georgia law provided that the unlawful
manufacture of distilled liquor on rented premises should work a forfeiture of the right of
the tenant at the option of the landlord. Nevertheless the Court held the search violative
of the fourth amendment on the grounds that (1) officers had time to secure a warrant;
(2) a house could not be lawfully searched without a warrant, except as an incident to an
arrest therein, notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause; and (3) until
entry, the landlord did not know that the premises were being used for unlawful manufacture
of liquor.
Although concurring in the result on the basis of his dissent in Rabinowitz, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter chided the majority for refusing to uphold what he judged to be a reasonable,
although warrantless, search under official Rabinowitz doctrine:
"The reasoning by which the Court reaches its result would be warranted were Trupiano
still law.... Since the Rabinowitz case expresses the prevailing view, the decision in
this case runs counter to it....
"Surely it is fair to say that the lower courts and prosecutors have a right to proceed
on the assumption, on the basis of controlling decisions, that whether or not a search is
'unreasonable' turns on the circumstances presented by a particular situation, as a matter
of substantive determination. On that test, I find it very difficult to conclude that a police
officer may not deem adequate the authorization of a landlord to enter his house without
a search warrant where he has solid ground for believing that his lessee is utilizing the house
as an illegal distillery." Id. at 618-19.
122 339 U.S. at 63.

123 Even the right of search incident to arrest, in whose name the reasonableness clause
had been resurrected, was a stumbling block to logic. Mr. Justice Jackson had complained
in Harris: "once the search is allowed to go beyond the person arrested and the objects
upon him or in his immediate possession, I see no practical limit short of that set in the
opinion of the Court-and that means to me no limit at all." 331 U.S. at 197 (dissenting
opinion).
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of new circumstances where reason would be unaided by prior decisions?
It is arguable that in Abel, the reasonableness clause faced just such a test-and
showed itself incapable of condemning what many thought to be a shocking
invasion of constitutional liberties.124
IV. THE REASONABLENESS OF EQUIVALENT PROTECTIONS
In the previous section it was suggested that the fourth amendment's
test of reasonableness was resurrected in Rabinowitz in order to accommodate
the right of search incident to arrest. It was clear that that right could no
longer be justified as a narrow but long-standing exception to warrant requirements. Without some formula or test to guide reason, however, the
Rabinowitz Court may have set sail on a sea of doubt. It is now suggested
that the required guidance might have been found in the warrant provisions
of the amendment.
The principle upon which such an argument could be built may be found
in an Abel dissent.125 In that case Mr. Justice Frankfurter had maintained
that although the deportation arrest warrant did not have prior judicial
approval, that fact should not impair the validity of the search. The situation
was analogous, he argued, to search incident to a criminal arrest, which
in Rabinowitz had been held valid without judicial approval.126 Mr. Justice
Brennan, in dissent, strongly argued the dissimilarity of the two procedures.
Although search incident to criminal arrest requires no priorjudicialapproval,
the arrest which legitimizes such a search "may constitutionally be made only
upon probable cause, the existence of which is subject to judicial examination
.. and such an arrest demands the prompt bringing of the person arrested
before a judicial officer, where the existence of probable cause is to be inquired into.... [Tihere must be some inquiry into the over-all protection
given the individual by the totality of the processes necessary to the arrest
27
and the seizure."
Mr. Justice Brennan sought to insure that the protections of search incident
to administrative arrest would be equivalent to those of search incident
to criminal arrest. From the standpoint of fourth amendment theory, a more
124 Curiously, a very different hypothesis may explain the vote of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
For him, "the Fourth Amendment incorporates a guiding history which gives meaning
to the phrase 'unreasonable searches and seizures' contained within it far beyond the meaning of the phrase in isolation and taken from the context of that history and its gloss upon
the Fourth Amendment." Chapman v. United States 365 U.S. 610, 619 (1961) (concurring
opinion). Whether beyond, or simply differing from, ordinary usage, the meaning of the

first clause of the amendment, for Mr. Justice Frankfurter, is contained in the rule of Trupiano. But when the first clause-and thus the second-are adjudged inapplicable to a case,
as in Abel, the amendment may be devoid of the further guidance which a more common
reading of the language would provide.
125 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 249-53 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 235-36.
127 Id.at 249-51.
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useful rule would be one which demanded that the protections of search
incident to any arrest be equivalent to the protections of warranted searches.
Whatever else may have been the intent of the forefathers in drafting the first
clause of the amendment, it would appear that searches conducted pursuant
to the warrant provisions of the second clause fulfill the requirement of reasonableness.12 8 Therefore the warrant provisions may be employed as a
touchstone to give some content to the reasonableness standard. Search procedures which give an "over-all protection" equal to that provided by full
warrant procedures would, on this theory, be equally reasonable.129 But
do searches incident to lawful arrest conform to this standard?
1. Basic to search warrant protections is the requirement of probable
cause. Its function is to guarantee a substantial probability that the invasions
involved in the search will be justified by discovery of offending items. Two
conclusions necessary to the issuance of the warrant must be supported by
substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of
being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in
the place to be searched.130 By comparison, the right of arrest arises only
when a crime is committed or attempted in the presence of the arresting officer
or when the officer has "reasonable grounds to believe"-sometimes stated
"probable cause to believe"-that a felony has been committed by the person
to be arrested.131 Although it would appear that the conclusions which
justify either arrest or the issuance of a search warrant must be supported
by evidence of the same degree of probity,132 it is clear that the conclusions
themselves are not identical.
In the case of arrest, the conclusion concerns the guilt of the arrestee, whereas in the case of search warrants, the conclusions go to the connection of the
items sought with crime and to their present location. A general right of
search, however, does not follow automatically from the fact of arrest. Rather,
the Court has demanded that the search be reasonably and in good faith
directed towards weapons by which an escape might be effected, or towards
3
the fruits or instrumentalities of the crime for which the arrest was made.1 3
12
8But see text accompanying notes 79-87 supra; see Reynard, supra note 119, at 276,
and authorities cited therein.
12 9The seed of this theory may have been sown in a dissent to Trupiano: "To insist upon
the use of a search warrant in situations where the issuance of such a warrant can contribute
nothing to the preservation of the rights which the Fourth Amendment was intended to
protect, serves only to open an avenue of escape for those guilty of crime and to menace
the effective operation of government which is an essential precondition to the existence
of all civil liberties." Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 714-15 (1948) (Vinson,
C. J., dissenting).
130 See United States v. Old Dominion Warehouse, Inc., 10 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1926).
131 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3052-53 (1950); Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (Supp. 1960).
132 Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 n.3 (1959).
133 See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 149-55 (1946).
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In the case of weapons, common knowledge of criminal behavior might argue
that evidence sufficient to support a conclusion of guilt would also support
the conclusion of possession. In the case of fruits and instrumentalities,
the requirement of good faith may limit search rights to those cases in which
the crime is of such a nature that evidence of commission indicates that certain
1 34
fruits or instrumentalities were involved.
What remains to be supported by probable cause in the case of search
incident to arrest is the conclusion that the fruits or instrumentalities sought
will be found in the place of arrest. Here it must be admitted that however
reliable may be the inference from the commission of a crime to the conclusion
that certain types of fruits or instrumentalities were involved, the inference
from the latter proposition to the conclusion that those items will be found
at the place of arrest is far from compelling. Indeed, the probability that fruits
or instrumentalities will be found at the place of arrest is only slightly greater
than the probability that these items will be found in any place over which
the arrestee has control.
Yet opposite conclusions may be drawn from this fact. It may be argued
that since the probabilities of finding seizables is no greater in the place of
arrest than in any other place controlled by the arrestee, as, for example,
his car or garage, there are insufficient grounds to search any of these places.
Alternatively, it may be argued with some plausibility that if fruits or instrumentalities were involved in the arrest crime, the probabilities that they are
hidden in some place controlled by the arrestee is very high-sufficient,
perhaps, to justify the issuance of warrants to search any of the places involved.135 From this standpoint, the right of search incident to arrest is substantially narrowerthan a right which might be claimed by warrant, inasmuch
as it permits the search of only the place of arrest.136
134 Cf. id. at 153-54.
135 "[I]t can hardly be said that a reasonably cautious man would not be warranted
in the belief that contraband diamonds or records pertaining to them would be found in
the home, or any other place exclusively under the control, of the persons who were the
alleged culprits." United States v. Klapholz, 17 F.R.D. 18, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd,
230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 (1956). There, the affidavit upon which
warrants were issued to search defendants' apartment and safe deposit box contained information showing only (1) that defendants were implicated in diamond smuggling, (2) their
ownership of the places to be searched, and (3) the possibility that evidence of previous
smuggling existed somewhere.
In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1946), federal agents obtained warrants to
search both Harris' car and his private office. The affidavit upon which these warrants
were secured alleged in addition to the information and belief upon which the arrest warrant
had been issued only Harris' proprietary interest in the places to be searched. See Record,
pp. 22-32.
136 A certain randomness must be acknowledged in the selection of a particular place
for arrest and search among several which defendant may happen to own or control.
Mr. Justice Jackson suggested that officers would choose the place of arrest with a view
to their desire to search. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 197 (1946) (dissenting opin-
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2. A second protection which the fourth amendment provides in its require3
ments for search warrants is the particular description of items to be seized.1 7
If a general right of search followed from the fact of arrest, this protection
would surely be lost.' 38 Insofar as the likelihood of uncovering specific
categories of goods determines the scope of search incident to arrest, however,
the two procedures would appear to be similar. What is avoided in either
procedure is the "fishing expedition" in which entry is gained, ostensibly
for the purposes of seeking one item, with the search becoming a general
13
one for evidence of any offense. 9
It has been argued that in allowing the seizure of offending items unrelated
to the arrest crime, the Court has recently abandoned this fourth amendment
protection provided by warrant searches.' 40 In support of this contention,
it must be acknowledged that under present rulings, items not particularly
described in a warrant may not be seized.141 If the search which discovers
unexpected items has been conducted in good faith, however, this rule cannot
be justified by reference to additional invasions involved in seizing the items.
That the seizure of items so discovered is not intrinsically violative of con-

stitutional rights142 is demonstrated by the fact that no restriction is imposed
ion). Judge Learned Hand in an oft-quoted passage characterized this randomness somewhat
differently: "True, by hypothesis the power would not exist, if the supposed offender were
not found on the premises; but it is small consolation to know that one's papers are safe
only so long as one is not at home." United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203
(2d Cir. 1926). It may be inaccurate to suppose, however, that one's papers are safe in a
place for which the police could, at their option, obtain a search warrant. See note 135
supra. Moreover, it may be suggested that the requirement that a suspect witness warrantless
searches of his property provides some modicum of additional protection.
137 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV; FED. R. CRM. P. 41(c).
138 See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 197 (1946) (Jackson, 3., dissenting).
139 See id. at 149-50, 153-54; Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 225-30 (1956).
140 See generally Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 159 (1959).
141 Long recognized has been the rule, however, that contraband,though not described
in the search warrant, may be seized if found in the course of the search authorized thereby.
Steele v. United States [No. 1], 267 U.S. 498 (1925) (by implication); United States v.
Old Dominion Warehouse, Inc., 10 F.2d 736, 737 (2d Cir. 1926). Cf. Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947): "If entry upon the premises be authorized and the search
which follows be valid, there is nothing in the Fourth Amendment which inhibits the seizure
by law-enforcement agents of government property, the possession of which is a crime,
even though the officers are not aware that such property is on the premises when the search
is initiated." But see Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
142 "The validity of a search and seizure as incident to a lawful arrest has been based
upon a recognition by this Court that where law-enforcement agents have lawfully gained
entrance into premises and have executed a valid arrest of the occupant, the vital rights
of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment are not denied by seizure of the contraband
materials and instrumentalities of crime in open view or such as may be brought to light
by a reasonable search." Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 714 (1947) (Vinson,
C. J., dissenting).

690

T1E UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:664

.on officers securing additional warrants for this purpose.143 But it is urged
that limitations on the fruits of search tend to limit the search itself to those
bounds which good faith and prior authorization would allow.144 In this
explanation lies the basic purpose of a rule limiting seizables to searchables.
It would appear to be that of relieving the courts of the necessity of judging
whether a search was in fact conducted reasonably and in good faith. Yet
there is no indication that such a determination would tax the powers of
the courts beyond those limits already required in the determination of a
variety of fact issues. Indeed, it is precisely this sort of determination which
a magistrate would be required to make were officers to seek a second warrant
on the basis of information discovered in the course of a search made under
a prior warrant. 145 Assuming, then, that the determination of whether a search
was conducted reasonably is not beyond the powers of the courts to make,
the only protection lost by present rules on seizables is that provided by a
second trip to a magistrate.
3. Of central importance to those who decry the growth of the right of
search incident to arrest is the fact that such searches do not require the
prior approval of a magistrate. Although probable cause alone justifies arrest
and incidental search, it is the officer, rather than an independent magistrate,
who makes the assessment of probabilities. It is to this point that Mr. Justice
Jackson spoke in the passage already cited above: "The point of the Fourth
Amendment... is not that it denies law enforcement the support of usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
146
enterprise of ferreting out crime."'

143 Should the first search be unlawful, officers cannot, ofcourse, obtain a second warrant
on the basis of information gained thereby, nor use the tainted information for any other
purpose. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See also
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GuiLT 220-25 (1959), for a discussion of the general problem of
attenuation.
144 See Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 159 (1959).
145 Where a warrant for fruits or instrumentalities unrelated to the arrest crime was
sought, the magistrate would be required to determine, in addition, the probable connection
of the items sought with crime. Current restrictions on search incident to arrest may fall
short of equivalent protections at this point. In the motion to suppress evidence of items
unexpectedly found in the course of a search, inquiry should be made into (1) the legality
of the arrest, (2) the good faith of the search for items related to the arrest crime, and (3) the
reasons which officers had for believing that the items unexpectedly discovered were related
to crime. In the case of contraband, the problem would not arise. See Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). But in Abel, no inquiry was made into the officers' grounds
for believing that the various paraphernalia seized were related to espionage.
The significance of this departure from equivalent protections should not be overempha-

sized, however. Since the discovery of unexpected items is, ex hypothesi,legal, the officer's
oral testimony of what he saw would presumably be admissible into evidence, even if
seizure were prohibited.
146 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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The right of search incident to arrest does not, of course, provide the
protection of prior judicial approval. As Mr. Justice Brennan observed in
his dissent to Abel, however, the arrest which legitimizes such a search
carries with it the requirement that the arrestee be brought promptly before
a judicial officer. 147 There, or at a subsequent trial, the existence of probable
cause is to be inquired into.148 In assessing the validity of the arrest and search,
the court may not consider information received by officers subsequent
to the arrest or by means of the search. The inquiry on this issue presumably
parallels that which would be undertaken by a magistrate before issuing a
warrant. 149 Should insufficient cause for arrest be found, the coincident
search will be invalid, and the evidence secured by the search suppressed,
under the exclusionary rule. Where a search is subsequently found to be illegal, it is true that an absolute requirement of prior judicial approval would
have prevented the invasion. Yet this protection would prevent only
initial mistakes by inexperienced or confused officers. The theory behind the
exclusionary rule as a sanction against illegal searches and seizures is that
the officers, by being deprived of the "fruits" of illegal searches, will not
continue to employ unlawful means of law enforcement; thus subsequent
unjustified invasions will be prevented. 5 0 Where the sanction of the exclusionary rule is ineffective to prevent illegal behavior by officers bent on harassment
procedures, it is unlikely that an absolute warrant requirement would be
more effective.
Had a doctrine of equivalent protections been accepted by the Court
following Rabinowitz, there might have been no necessity to examine the
basic objectives and interests at work in search and seizure law. No such
doctrine has appeared, however. In this fact may lie the barest suggestion
147 362 U.S. at 251-53.
148 At the preliminary hearing, the Commissioner is to determine whether there is
"probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it." FED. R. CiUM. P. 4(c). The admissibility of evidence is one for the trial
court, however, and may not properly be decided by a commissioner at arraignment.
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 483-84 (1958). Thus where no search is made,
or where the post-arrest investigation is unsuccessful, the Commissioner's determination
would appear, on its face, to go to the issue of probable cause to arrest. But see generally
Barrett, PersonalRights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv.
46. Where evidence is secured by means of a post-arrest search, however, the issue of probable cause to arrest must await determination by the district court. See FED. R. Ci..
P. 41(e).
149 It is true that the movant in motions to suppress has the burden of proving the illegali,ty of the search, whereas the government must bear the burden of proof when it seeks a
:search warrant. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955). But inasmuch as the "defendant" is never represented at the issuance of a warrant, his protections
,in the two proceedings may not be as disparate as it would appear.
150 "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel
espect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing
,the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). See, e.g.,
-Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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that the pressures which led to the demise of Trupiano demanded more
than freedom from the mechanical burdens of obtaining a writ. Equivalent
protections may be greater protections than should be granted for all searches
and seizures.
V. THE SHADow OF Ti F=- ABNDi mNr
In making the reasonableness clause the dominant requirement of the
amendment, Rabinowitz affected a revolution in fourth amendment theory.
The revolution was one of promise: all searches were to be brought within
the scope of the amendment; variations in standards for criminal and administrative searches could be rationalized. But absent a doctrine of equivalent
protections, the promise is contingent upon discovery of the objectives
bearing upon reasonableness. The right of privacy and public law enforcement
are the only desiderata which have been offered to guide judgment. Frank
taught that they were incapable of justifying even existing standards on search
and seizure; much less can this two-value analysis guide the subtle re-fashioning of standards which continual conflicts demand.
A quest for the additional objectives which may influence the Court is
required. A return to Frank v. Maryland provides the proper starting place.
There, it was seen, Mr. Justice Frankfurter distinguished between two
protections which emerged from the amendment. The second of these was
"self-protection: the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its
design the securing of information to fortify the coercive power of the state
against the individual, information which may be used to effect a further
deprivation of life or liberty or property.... It is this aspect of the constitutional protection to which the quoted passages from Entick v. Carrington
5
and Boyd v. United States refer."' '
The passages quoted from Entick and Boyd, and the broader decisions
from which they were drawn, must be examined with care, for out of these
cases came "the mystic union" of the fourth and fifth amendments1 52 which
has had interesting effects on search and seizure law. Entick v. Carrington1S3
involved an action in trespass against officers of the Crown, arising from a
search of plaintiff's home and the seizure of his private papers. The search
was made pursuant to a general executive warrant, charging plaintiff with
seditious libel. The great question before Lord Camden was whether a warrant
to search for and seize a citizen's private papers could ever be lawful. He
argued that:
[T]he great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property.
That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has
151359 U.S. at 365.
152 Cf. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties,
45 ILL. L. R v. 1, 22 (1950).
153 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole....
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute,
is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but
he is liable to an action.... If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way
of justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused him.... If
no such excuse can be found or produced, the silence of the books is an authority
against the defendant, and the plaintiff must have judgment.S4
By this test Lord Camden examined all suggested justifications for the trespass
and found them inapplicable. The last which he considered was, "an argument
of utility, that such a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering
evidence. I wish some cases had been shown, where the law forceth evidence
out of the owner's custody by process.... In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of.... [O]ur law has provided no paper-search in these
cases to help forward the prosecution."1 55
Having found no prior authority for the trespass, Lord Camden turned
to the positive arguments for the denial of the right claimed: "Whether this
proceedeth from the gentleness of the law toward criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the innocent than useful
to the public, I will not say."1 5 6 The paragraph quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter followed immediately:
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the
necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well
as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search for
evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too the innocent would
be confounded with the guilty.
Observe the wisdom as well as mercy of the law. The strongest evidence before
a trial, being only ex parte, is but suspicion; it is not proof. Weak evidence is a
ground of suspicion, though in a lower degree; and if suspicion at large should
be a ground of search, especially in the case of libels, whose house would be safeT?5,
It is clear that Entick provides no basis for a doctrine of interrelation
between the fourth amendment and the self-incrimination clause of the fifth.
The warrant in Entick fails for lack of an authoritative justification which
will overcome the prima facie case of trespass. That the need to discover
evidence of crime provides no such justification is positively supported
on alternative theories of "the gentleness of the law toward criminals"
and of the inherent difficulty in selecting the proper persons to subject to
the invasions involved. The second theory turns, in effect, upon a question
of probable cause. For Lord Camden, the serious invasion involved in the
seizure of a citizen's private papers could, at best, find its justification only
in the guilt of the individual. But to justify such an invasion solely by the
154 Id. at
157

1066.

155 Id. at 1073.

156 Ibid.

Id. at 1073-74. The second paragraph was not quoted in Frank.
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evidence of crime which it might uncover was to admit that the individual
was merely a suspect, not a proven criminal.
Compulsory self-accusation was disallowed on the same theory. In both
cases, invasions of civil liberties, justifiable only by proven guilt, were themselves used to secure proof of guilt. The danger common to both procedures
was that the innocent would be confounded with the guilty.
The first ground on which Lord Camden had dismissed the claim that
general warrants were justified by the need to discover evidence of crime
was "the gentleness of the law toward criminals." He did not expand on
the notion. What may have been intended was the view that certain techniques
of law enforcement are so violative of civil liberties as to be repugnant to
the conscience of the community. An analogy to the fifth amendment could
again be drawn, for one of the justifications for its protections has been the
moral judgment that compelling self-accusation would be an unconscionable
exercise of state power. 158
In Boyd v. United States159 the union of the fourth and fifth amendments
was made, based, it would appear, on a misreading of Lord Camden's
analogies. The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a statutory
provision of the federal revenue laws. The statute provided that in forfeiture
proceedings instituted for the alleged non-payment of import duties, the court
might issue a notice to defendants requiring the production in court of relevant
books and records. Upon failure of the defendant to comply with the orderwhich was, in form, like a subpoena duces tecum-the allegations of the
government as to the contents of the papers were to be taken as confessed
by the defendant.
A minority of the Court thought the statute unconstitutional under the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. However, Mr. Justice
Bradley, speaking for the majority, concluded that the validity of the statute
was to be judged primarily under the fourth. He argued: "It is true that
certain aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, such as forcible
entry into a man's house and searching amongst his papers, are wanting...
but it accomplishes the substantial object of... forcing from a party evidence
against himself."160 That the "search and seizure" permitted by the statute
was unreasonable under the fourth amendment was argued on much the
same pattern as in Entick. The violations of an individual's security could
only be justified by an independent proprietary-like interest which the state
had in the objects to be seized. No such interest existed in the case of personal
papers which normally had, for the state, only evidentiary value. In support
of this contention, the Court quoted at length from Entick v. Carrington,
158 See, e.g., GRISWOLD, THE Frm AMENDMNT TODAY 7-8 (1955); MAGUIRE, op. cit.

supra note 143, at 14.
159 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
160 Id. at 622.
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ending with the analogy to self-incrimination there drawn. Mr. Justice Bradley
summarized:
It is not the breaking of his doors... that constitutes the essence of the offence;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property... which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.... Any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.161
The basis for the relationship between the two amendments was stated
in the following passage, later quoted in Frank:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments.
They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures"
condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose
of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases
is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment
throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive
that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against
him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.162
It may be fair to say that for the past half-century, scholars have been
unable to perceive the "intimate relation" which Mr. Justice Bradley detected
between the two amendments. 163 Part of the problem may lie in the knowledge
of subsequent cases which modem commentators bring to their interpretation
of Boyd. Boyd was the first fourth amendment case of any importance to
reach the Supreme Court.164 The warrant clause of the amendment was
applicable to all searches, with narrow exceptions, but no gloss had been
placed on the requirement of reasonableness. The only guidelines available
were English decisions from the time of Entick.165 Under these circumstances,
the Court apparently concluded that the function of the reasonableness
161 Id. at 630.
162 Id. at 633.
163 See, e.g., WIGMORE, EvrDENcE § 2264 (3d ed. 1940); MAGUIRE, op. cit. supra note
143, at § 2.04; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
29 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 16 (1930); Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the
Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 687, 699-701 (1951). The Boyd
position was anticipated, however, in COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 305-07 (1868).
164 The dearth of cases reaching the Court during the first century of the amendment's
operation may be explained, in part, by the fact that no right of appeal to the Supreme
Court in criminal cases was granted until 1891. 26 Stat. 827 (1891), 28 U.S.C. § 346 (1926).
165 In addition to Entick, see, e.g., Wilkes' Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 981 (1763); Leach
v. Moniey, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001 (1765).
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66
clause was to prohibit warranted searches for merely evidentiary objects.1
In Entick the prohibition had been based, essentially, on a theory of probable cause. In Lord Camden's view, to search for merely evidentiary materials
was to concede that the Crown possessed insufficient evidence to justify
the search. By misreading the Entick analogy, however, Mr. Justice Bradley
understood the decision to be based on a rule of evidence. That rule, which
antedated Entick167 and is incorporated into the fifth amendment, 168 protects
a witness against the compulsory production of documents or chattels for
use in evidence in a criminal trial. Although sometimes criticized,169 the rule
was properly applied in Boydwhere the admissibility of a document produced
under compulsion of law was in issue. Entick, however, involved an action
for damages in trespass. The use to which the seized articles would be put
was not at issue. 170 The privilege against sel-incrimination, thus, was no
more relevant there than it would be in an action against a police officer
for assault in obtaining a confession.
For several years following Boyd the Court appeared unwilling to follow
the suggested theory of fourth and fifth amendment interrelation.171 The
shadow of the fifth had been cast on search and seizure law, however, and
would not easily be dispelled. As befits the shifting outlines of a shadow,

166 This position was subsequently supported by several commentators. See, e.g.,
Reynard, Freedomfrom UnreasonableSearch and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional
Right ? 25 IND. L.J. 259, 276 (1950); Corwin, supra note 163, at 15-27.
167 See, e.g., Rex v. Purnell, 1 W. Bl. 37, 45 (1749). See also Roe v. Harvey, 4 Burr.
2484, 2489 (1769).
168 See generally Morgan, The Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv.
1, 34-38 (1949) and cases cited therein.
169 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 163, at 699-701.
170 Wigmore argued that before Boyd, the rule applied only to "the production of documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to
a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treatinghim
as a witness (i.e. as a person appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on his
moral responsibility for truth-telling)...." The privilege against self incriminationalthough directed primarily at oral admissions-must include documents produced under
these circumstances, he reasoned, because the witness "would be at any time liable to make
oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the articles produced." 8 WIGMOE, op.
cit. supra note 163, at § 2264. This rationale is criticized in Meltzer, supra note 163, at
700. For a reformulation of the Wigmore rationale which may avoid the criticism, see
MAGUmE, op. cit. supra note 143, at 23.

Where, as in Entick, documents or chattels are seized under circumstances in which
the owner is not "treated as a witness"-or, in Maguire's terms, is not required to participate
in the incriminatory process by responding to a descriptive demand-Wigmore argues
that the materials may be used evidentially. 8 WiMoRE, op. cit. supra note 163, at § 2264
and cases cited therein. This is a part, of course, of Wigmore's broader criticism of the exclusionary rule of evidence. Insofar as the claim accurately states the rule at the time of
Entick, however, it lends support to the suggested reading of that case. See Francia's Trial,
15 How. St. Tr. 897, 966 (1717).
171 See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1940);
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
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the fifth amendment was subsequently cited in support of a variety of propositions in search and seizure cases. The rule prohibiting the search for, or seizure
of, "merely evidential materials," was cited to Boyd and justified by general
reference to the fifth amendment.17 2 Occasionally, it was suggested that
searches not involving private papers were illegal under both the fourth and

the fifth amendments, recalling the widespread interaction which Mr. Justice
Bradley saw at work.173 In the early cases following Weeks, and more recently
in Mapp v. Ohio, the federal exclusionary rule was justified by reference to

the fifth.174 Mr. Justice Frankfurter disclaimed any particular theory concerning the interrelation of the amendments in Frank, but the distinction
there drawn between searches for evidence of crime, and searches for rats or
rubbish, was supported by reference to Entick and Boyd.175
To ifiveigh against the Boyd theory of the intimate relation between the
amendments should not lead to a disregard of the beneficial influence which
fifth amendment analogies have had on search and seizure law. Yet the
lessons to be learned from the analogies may never have been better drawn
than in Entick.
The first is this. One of the dangers to be avoided by the privilege against
self-incrimination is said to be that posed by the "lazy prosecutor" who,
absent the protection, would rely on compulsory self-incrimination rather
than less invasive procedures to develop his cases. 176 Lord Camden suggested
that search and seizure were subject to the same danger. To invade precious
civil liberties by either technique for the purpose of securing evidence, is
inevitably to subject innocent persons to some phase of the criminal process.
The first counsel of fifth amendment analogies, then, is directed against
the use of search and seizure as an investigative technique. The fourth amendment requirement of probable cause for the issuance of warrants reflects
the same concern, as does the demand that non-warrant searches normally
be conducted co-incident with arrest. 177 Yet the analogy is not taken as a
17 2
See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
173 McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927); Gambino v. United States, 273
U.S. 310 (1927).
174 See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192 (1927); Mapp v, Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
175 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
176 See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 163, at § 2251. But see Meltzer, supra note 163,
at 690.
177 The federal requirement that an arrestee be brought before a committing magistrate
without unreasonable delay (see FFD. R. Cium. P. 5; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957)) entails the notion that probable cause to arrest will be sufficient grounds for
arraignment. ("Arraignment" is used here as a shorthand term. See MAGUiRE, op. cit.
supra note 143, at 161-62.) Were such a standard to be imposed rigorously, search incident
to arrest would seldom be necessary or useful as an investigative technique. See generally
Barrett, supra note 148.
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counsel of perfection, however absolute may be the prohibition against
compulsory self-incrimination. To construct a similarly absolute rule against
the seizure of merely evidentiary objects is to ignore the fact that an alleged
proprietary interest of the state in the objects of seizure is no guarantee
against harassment of the innocent. And to demand conclusive proof of guilt
before countenancing the invasions involved in search is to ignore the gravity
of competing interests in law enforcement and other community needs.
A calculus of reason is evidently required. But in the computation it
cannot be forgotten that search and seizure, particularly in the absence of
a warrant, come at an early stage in the law enforcement process. The danger
of confounding the innocent with the guilty is greater here than in subsequent
stages, which may be reached only after a variety of judicially-controlled
checks.
The second analogy supported by Entick casts a shadow of indeterminate
length on search and seizure law. It turns on the notion of enforcement techniques so violative of human dignity as to be repugnant to the conscience
of the community. The concept eludes justificatory analysis because of its
proximity to the core of the society's value system. The state may imprison
a man, but it may not flog him. It may execute him, but it may not torture
him. It may compel him to testify against his father, but it may not demand
that he incriminate himself. Judgments of this character might well be unaffected by the certain assurance that the techniques would only be directed
against the guilty. Such notions may well lurk at the periphery of the fourth
amendment. The Court has reflected them in its summary disposition of
several search and seizure ,cases involving extreme violations of individual
rights.178 But other cases, very nearly as shocking, have evoked no such
reaction. 179 Something approaching a fundamental moral judgment may
have led to the absolute rule against seizing private books and papers. If
so, the judgment was short-lived, for the rule was sapped of its vitality by
subsequent cases.' 80
The future influence of basic ethical notions on search and seizure law
is difficult to predict. The greatest deterrant of their growth is the fact of
established practices and the pressure of collective needs for effective law
enforcement. For this reason, their influence may be a conservative one-that
of resisting any relaxation of current safeguards on rights of search.
178 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (emetic used to recover capsules
of morphine which defendant had swallowed when officers forced their way into his bedroom).
179 See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (blood sample taken to determine
intoxication while petitioner was unconscious following automobile accident in which
he was involved). See also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
180 See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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VI. TBE HEDGE AGAINST BAD LAW

The fourth amendment was drafted during a period when the law was
in disrepute.181 The major growth of search and seizure law came in cases
arising under the National Prohibition Act.182 Out of those cases, the rulings
most restrictive on search and seizure practices appeared in the early 1930's
after Prohibition had lost much of its popular support.18 3 A high water mark
in safeguards on search and seizure was reached shortly following the Second
World War, when the memory of European experience with totalitarian
rule was still clear in the mind of the Court.184 Correlations of this kind have
led to suggestions that judicial distrust or disapproval of the law itself has
occasionally had an influence on both search and seizure standards and on
the exclusionary rule of evidence. 8 5
For any calculus of reasonableness to operate, some assessment must
be made of the gravity of the law enforcement interests which is sought to
justify particular invasions of civil liberties.186 But to suggest that some restrictions on search and seizure practice have as their sole purpose making more
arduous the conviction and punishment of the guilty is quite a different matter.
The charge would, at worst, be that of judicial nullification; at best, that of
using Bentham's "fox hunter's reason," or of undue "sentimentality" towards
offenders. 8 7
No such charge is here made. What is suggested is that the cases reveal
hints of the theory that the substance of the law itself may be influenced by
the enforcement techniques available to it. Dissenting in Harris v. United
States, Mr. Justice Murphy argued:
The principle established by the Court today can be used as easily by some
future government determined to suppress political opposition under the guise
of sedition as it can be used by a government determined to undo forgers and defrauders.... History is not without examples of the outlawry of certain political,
religious and economic beliefs and the relentless prosecution of those who dare to
181 See LASSON, THE HIsToRY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FoURTH AMENDMEN To THE
UNrrED STATES CONSTITUTION 52, 67-69 (1937); Reynard, The Right of Privacy, in FUNDAmENTAL LAW IN CRIaNAL PROSEcUrONS 85, 88 (Harding ed. 1959).

182 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Byars v. United States, 273
U.S. 28 (1927); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
183 See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
184 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699 (1948).
185 See, e.g., PutrKAMMEm, ADmnSTRATION OF CRIMiAL LAW 80-81 (1953); Waite,
Reasonable Search and Research, 86 U. PA. L. Rav. 623 (1938); WIGMORE, op. cit. supra
note 163, at § 2184.
186 Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
187
See WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 163, at § 2184; cf. MAGUImE, EVIDENCE OF GurLT

12 (1959).
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entertain such beliefs. And history has a way of repeating itself. It therefore takes
no stretch of the imagination to picture law enforcement officers arresting those
accused of believing, writing or speaking that which is proscribed, accompanied
by a thorough ransacking of their homes as an "incident" to an arrest in an effort
to uncover "anything" of a seditious nature. Under the Court's decision, the Fourth
Amendment no longer stands as a bar to such tyranny and oppression.188
It is clear that the danger to which Mr. Justice Murphy referred is not
simply that of over-bearing police in an otherwise democratic society. Rather,
he warns that the availability of broad police powers will encourage, or at least
provide no hedge against, the deterioration of the political order itself. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter spoke in much the same vein in his dissent in Harris:
"How can there be freedom of thought or freedom of speech or freedom of
religion, if the police can, without warrant, search your house and mine
from garret to cellar merely because they are executing a warrant?... Yesterday the justifying document was an illicit ration book, tomorrow it may be
some suspect piece of literature." 8 9 Davis v. United States evoked similar
warnings: "It is not only under Nazi rule that police excesses are inimical
to freedom.... History bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights
of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in
the end."'190 The latter passage might seem to suggest that the danger to be
avoided is the slow erosion of all traditional liberties. If this were the crux
of the problem the fourth amendment would not be properly viewed as a
special "bar to such tyranny and oppression." A careful reading of the passages indicates, however, a theory of unique relation between broad powers of
search and seizure and the rise of a totalitarian state. Totalitarian regimes
may be characterized, in part, by the types of offenses with which they are
most concerned: sedition, heresy, unpopular thought, disapproved literature.
These are all "victimless crimes," or at least crimes of which the government
is the only victim. Search and seizure procedures are uniquely suited-perhaps
indispensible-to the detection ofjust such crimes. It is reasonable to suppose,
therefore, that strict controls on the right of search and seizure would provide
one hedge against the kind of oppressive law which only such procedures
could make enforceable.
It is arguable that broad powers of administrative search would provide
as useful a vehicle for oppression as would similar powers to search for evidence of crime. That position was urged by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent
in Frank,191 and may have been demonstrated in Abel. Nevertheless, the
principle may support some distinction between searches for evidence of
crime and searches for rats and rubbish. That the distinction should turn
188 331 U.S. 145, 194 (1947).

189 Id. at 163.

190 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
191 359 U.S. at 375.
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on the broad concept of "administrative processes," however, may be open
to doubt.
VII. INJURY TO REPUTATION

From the shadow of the fifth amendment was drawn the warning that
searches for evidence of crime will inevitably violate the civil liberties of the
innocent as well as the guilty. The proportion of innocent who suffer, to
guilty whose crimes are detected, will be a function of the quality of pre-search
information required. In setting the standards of probable cause, an assessment must be made of the degree to which innocent men will suffer from
mistaken searches.
Whether the search be for rubbish or narcotics, both innocent and guilty
will suffer the loss of the proprietary right of privacy.192 The search for
evidence of crime, however, threatens the innocent with an injury not recognized in the cases. That is the damage to reputation resulting from an overt
manifestation of official suspicion of crime. Connected with loss of reputation,
standing, or credit may be humiliation and other mental suffering. The
interests here at stake are the same which are recognized in the common law
actions for defamation and malicious prosecution.193 Indeed, the loss of
reputation and the humiliation resulting from the search of one's home for
evidence of a heinous crime may greatly exceed the injury caused by an illgrounded prosecution for a minor offense.
Curiously, the risk of injury to reputation may vary directly with the
quantum of pre-search information required. A road block and search of all
passing cars for fleeing robbers implies only limited suspicion of any given
driver; a house-to-house search for a notorious criminal thought to be in
the neighborhood may be equally innocuous from this standpoint. What
the innocent citizen has most reason to fear is being singled out as the object
of official suspicion. Although illegal search and seizure does not give rise
to an action for malicious prosecution or defamation, the interests protected
by those actions might properly influence the courts in determining requirements for search and seizure.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The fourth amendment, like the due process clause of the fourteenth,
has been heavily overworked in the absence of specific legislation implementing its general directives. As with all constitutional provisions, the fourth
must ultimately derive its content from the sensibilities of a democratic society.
Yet the determinants at work in this area of the law have often been obscureeven, one feels, to the Court itself.
Trupiano and Rabinowitz constituted a theoretical watershed in fourth
amendment litigation. A half-century of prior cases had been peculiarly
192 See id. at 382.

193 See generally ProssER, ToRTs 572-84, 645-62 (2d ed. 1955).
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devoid of analytical content. The constitutional provision which the Court
was expounding in search and seizure cases was the warrant clause of the
fourth amendment. That clause, more legislative than constitutional in
flavor, veiled by its very specificity the formlessness of the fundamental liberty
it protected. By-the time that Trupiano articulately stated the rule which the
Court was enforcing, the rule had already been drained of vitality by exceptions, and had been made obsolete by accepted law enforcement practices.
Rabinowitz was a child of promise. Like Trupiano it sought to bring all
searches within the structure of the amendment. Unlike Trupiano, perhaps,
it sought an accommodation with law enforcement concerns, the frustration
of which threatens all liberties. The basis of that accommodation was found,
if not in the minds of the forefathers, at least in the language of the Constitution. The warrant clause would continue to guard against general writs;
indeed, reason might require that warrants be secured for many searches.
But only the reasonableness clause could sustain exceptions which had engulfed old rules. To its protection was committed the fundamental liberty
which the amendment established.
But the promise of Rabinowitz was not fulfilled. Reasonableness demands
reasons. Only the proprietary right of privacy and the need for law enforcement were offered. The parthenogenetic progeny, first of one, then of the
6
5
other of these objectives were Abel,194 Silverman,19 and Chapman.19
The application of the rule of reasonableness was not the only problem.
In other cases, the rule itself was placed in doubt. Less than two years after
Rabinowitz, a new majority stated that "over and again this Court has
emphasized that the mandate of the Amendment requires adherence to
judicial processes.... Only where incident to a valid arrest.., or in 'exceptional circumstances,' may an exemption lie, and then the burden is on those
seeking the exemption to show the need for it ... "197 Johnson v. United
States198 and McDonald v. United States,199 both from the Trupiano period,
were cited as authority. Similar language is found more recently in Jones
v. United States: "The exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon
a search warrant have been jealously and carefully drawn, and search incident
to valid arrest is among them." 200 In Chapman v. United States, Johnson
is again relied upon:" 'No reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant
except for the inconvenience to the officers.... These are never very convincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly are not enough to bypass the constitutional requirement.' "201 The disturbing factor in these
194 See text accompanying notes 34-41 supra.

195 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See text accompanying notes 62-64
supra.

Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); see note 121 supra.
1 7 Jeffers v. United States, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
196
9

198 333 U.S. 10 (1948).

200 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).

199 335 U.S. 451 (1948).

201 365 U.S. at 615.
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cases is the theoretical indecision which their language reveals. The exclusionary rule, like all deterrent systems, is genuinely effective against only those
offenses involving an element of scienter. But repeatedly, members of the
Court have protested against the confusing pattern which the cases present
to law enforcement officers.
An alternative explanation may be given to the obiter dicta in Jeffers,202
Jones and Chapman. They may foreshadow an eventual return of the Court
to the rule of Trupiano. Interestingly, a five man "minority" of the present
Court, not recently coalesced, profess continued sympathy with that position. 203 Yet the probability that Rabinowitz will be overruled would appear
to be small. Trupiano, Johnson, and McDonald offer a convenient arsenal
of weapons against disapproved searches. The common bond among the
minority of five, however, is not strong. Mr. Justice Frankfurter bows to
Trupiano as a mandate of history; were "reasonableness" to him not a word
of art, his votes in Abel and Chapman might well have been reversed. 204
For the Chief Justice, and Justices Douglas and Brennan, it is a non-technical
20 5
interpretation of "reasonableness" which demands a return to Trupiano.
The framework they seek is not that of the early commentators; but even
when read conventionally, "reasonableness," for them, requires that warrants
be employed whenever practicable. Mr. Justice Black originally opposed the
rule of Trupiano.20 6 In Rabinowitz, however, he dissented, arguing that the
orderly administration of justice required that Trupiano, once established,
be accorded a fair test of time. 207 The theory which supports his continued
sympathy for the rule is not clear.
Additional considerations argue against a return to Trupiano. The administrative search cases present a complex obstacle. Four members of the "minority" 208 are unwilling to accept the distinction between criminal and administrative searches. Yet it would seem unlikely that searches for rats and rubbish
could long be subjected to the stringency of the former rule. 209
Even more difficult would be the problem of accommodation with law
enforcement concerns. Since Wolf v. Colorado210 there has been a movement
toward imposing increasingly strict standards upon searches by state of202 Jeffers v. United States, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
203 Mr. Justice Frankfurter (Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (concurring)); Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, and the Chief Justice (Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360, 380 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
204 Cf., e.g., Chapman v. United States 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (concurring opinion).
205 Cf., e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 248 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
206 334 U.S. at 710.
207 339 U.S. at 66.

208 Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, and the Chief Justice. See Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
209 Even the dissenters in Frankrecognized that more liberal warrant requirements might
be necessary in health inspection cases. 359 U.S. at 383.
31o

338 U.S. 25 (1959).
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21

ficers. ' Four of the five justices who favor Trupiano appear to maintain
that all fourth amendment standards are made applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth. 21 2 Were this doctrine of
Elkins v. United States21 3 to be combined with a return to Trupianostandards,
the Court might be subject to extreme pressures from state law enforcement
agencies.
If a return to Trupiano is impracticable, what alternative is available
to the Court? A half-century of conflicts frames the scope of the problem:
prevailing search practices must be brought within the outlines of the amendment. Warrants must find a clear rationale. Searches for rats and rubbish
must be distinguished from searches for evidence of crime on grounds and
by concepts reflecting the objectives of the law. Electronic surveillance must
respect the liberty of the amendment, rather than the perimeters of the
close. Finally, the full objectives of search and seizure law must be articulated
and applied to ever-changing patterns of crime and investigation.
If the promise of Rabinowitz pales before the complexities of the problems,
it may nevertheless suggest initial steps toward their resolution. Some of the
reasons demanded by the rule of Rabinowitz may be found in Frank. Their
use suggests a calculus by which reasonableness may be determined. In
Frank, three considerations bore on the Court's evaluation of the search:
the community need which prompted the search, the seriousness of the invasions on privacy involved, and the probabilities of success in discovering
offending conditions. To be sure, the right to search for evidence of crime
must be surrounded with safeguards substantially greater than those controlling inspectors of rats and rubbish. Rather than making a calculus of
reason inapplicable, however, this fact simply demands that all relevant considerations be brought to bear on the calculus. Criminal searches often
involve, in addition to invasions of privacy, substantial damage to reputation.
This fact, coupled with the lesson from Entick that some searches for evidence
of crime inevitably will be directed at innocent persons, provide a calculus
factor capable of demanding higher standards of criminal searches.
Yet even this expanded calculus might not put all proper fears to rest.
Such a calculus might permit shocking invasions where the community
need was great and the probabilities of guilt high. However useful the calculus
in evaluating common searches, some outer limits must be set on its operation.
211See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960); Mapp v. Ohio, 365 U.S. 643 (1961).
212
See e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The fifth, Mr. Justices Frankfurter, adamantly opposes the view. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 233 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
213 364 U.S. 206 (1960). In Elkins, the Court held that "evidence obtained by state
officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the
defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible ... in a federal criminal trial." 364 U.S. at 223.
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Those limits, it is suggested, can be found in the basic notions--encountered
above as shadows on the amendment-of civilized standards of law enforcement and hedges against bad law. Any search and seizure would have to
fall inside these outer limits before it could be tested by the calculus of reason.
The operation of such a pattern would not be very different from the way
in which the Court has decided a number of recent cases. In Rochin v. California21 4 the limits of civility may well have been transgressed. Kremen
v. United States215 might be read as a triumph of the proprietary right of
privacy, not inconsistent with the weight given that right in Frank.In Kremen
the seizure of the entire contents of defendant's cabin served no clear societal
purpose. Neither the fact that the search and seizure were made incident
to lawful arrest nor the certainty that the defendants were guilty of crime could
compensate for the slight utility of the invasion.
But the similarity of results in extreme cases does not hide the fact that
calculus determination might often vary from the results reached by inflexible
standards in normal circumstances. Most cases involving search for evidence
of crime would not be disposed of by those considerations which impose
absolute standards. They would find their way to the balance and there would
be treated in a revolutionary manner. For the first time the seriousness of the
crime would be a relevant factor. It is possible that something short of
probable cause to arrest and arraign would legitimize investigative techniques
involving minor trespasses.
At this point the central problem in the conceptual scheme arises. A calculus
requires quantitative assessments of relevant circumstances in a search. More
important, it demands that an initial weighting factor be assigned to each
of the determinants. Injury to reputation, for example, might exert more
or less weight than would trespass on private property. But if the reasonableness clause, which supports such a calculus, be cut adrift from the warrant
requirements of the amendment and from the guidance they supply, how
are the courts to weight the interrelated interests bearing on search and
seizure? Common law techniques may be equal to the task. Ideally, however,
the courts could look to guidance from the legislatures, the branch of government which can best presume to reflect the assessments of the community.
The introduction of a calculus might thus encourage Congress to enter
an area from which the rigidities of the warrant have previously excluded
it,216 and to relieve the fourth amendment from day to day pressures greater
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
U.S. 346 (1957).
216 Legislative involvement in the area is rare. The most common exceptions are statutes
which withhold the right to secure search warrants to investigate specific types of activity
or which limit the scope of the writ. For a comprehensive collection of such congressional
enactments, see Appendix to Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 616 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). A rare example where Congress lowered the probable cause requirement,
and authorized warrantless searches can be found in the enactments of the first Congress
214
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than it can bear. No judicial abdication would be involved. The outer limits
on search and seizure techniques would be safeguarded by the Constitution
and enforced by the courts. Variations in calculus weightings within those
limits could be only as broad as the area in which reasonable men may differ.
That Rabinowitz, Frank, and Abel sowed the seeds of such a revolution
in search and seizure law appears clear. That those seeds will come to fruition
in the manner suggested may be doubtful. Nevertheless, present patterns of
search and seizure practice cannot be reconciled with official theory. The bed
is too short and the covers too narrow.
regarding inspection of vessels. Act of July 31, 1798, ch. 5, § 24,1 Stat. 29, 43. Like provisions
are found in the Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 48-51, 1 Stat. 145, 170; Act of February
18, 1793, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315; Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 68-71, 1 Stat. 627,677,
678. The National Prohibition Act contained carefully worked out provisions regarding
search. For example, dwellings were immune from warranted searches unless being used
for the sale of illicit liquor. 41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919). In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925), the act was construed to authorize the warrantless search of moving vehicles.
Involvement of state legislatures has taken a variety of forms. A few statutes have
attacked the exclusionary rule rather than substantive standards. Michigan, for example,
has eliminated the exclusionary rule in narcotics and possession of weapons cases. MicI.
CoNsT. art. II, § 10, as amended in 1936 and 1952. Maryland, attacked the problem at the
other end by adopting legislation which made illegally obtained evidence inadmissible in
misdemeanor cases, retaining admissiblity in felony cases. Then, the statute was amended
to permit illegally secured evidence to be admitted in certain misdemeanor cases when prosecuted in particular counties. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 5 (1957). Cf. Salsburg v. Maryland346 U.S. 545 (1954). These efforts would seem to be misdirected; they attack one form of
illegality by fostering another-the latter on the part oflaw enforcement officers themselves.
See Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL.
L. Rav. 1, 19 (1950).
Legislative attacks on the substantive problem have also been attempted. (1) The Uniform
Arrest Act § 3 provides for frisking of persons detailed under § 2 (which provides for a two
hour period of detention of suspected persons) upon reasonable grounds to believe that the
person is carrying a weapon. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942).
(2) The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act § 23 (See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 192.28 (1959))
gives narcotics officers the power "without a warrant, to enter and examine all buildings,
vessels, cars, conveyances, vehicles or other structures or places, and to open and examine
any box, barrel, parcel, package, or other receptacle in the possession of any common
carrier, which they have reason to believe contains" illicit narcotic drugs. (3) Many states
have given officers visitation rights in premises licensed (most commonly liquor establishments) by the state. The rights are justified on a theory of reasonable conditions upon the
grant of a state privilege, or on a theory of consent. The Illinois Liquor Control Act, for
example, authorizes officers "to enter at any time upon any premises licensed hereunder
to determine whether any of the provisions of this Act or any rules or regulations. . . have
been or are being violated" (the regulations incorporate all of the laws of the state). ILL.
Rev. STAT. ch. 43, § 190 (1959) and regulations thereunder.
The language of Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. Di RE, 332 U.S. 581, 585 (1948),
should be added encouragement to Congress to enter the field of search and seizure which
it has so long neglected: "Obviously the Court should be reluctant to decide that a search
thus authorized by Congress was unreasonable and that the Act was therefore unconstitutional ... especially when it turns on what is 'reasonable'...."

